(YemenOnline) - It has been widely reported that conditions in Yemen are deteriorating under the influence of insurgents, public rioting, and al-Qaida.  

A Shiite group has waged an insurgency since 2004 against government forces in the far north of the country, in the region around Saada. It has even conducted operations on the outskirts of the capital, Sanaa.  

In addition, there has been growing unrest and even riots in the south — which had been an independent state under Marxist rule from 1967 until its unification with North Yemen in 1990.

Further, groups linked to al-Qaida have undertaken a number of bombings, including in Sanaa.

Each one of these is a serious threat, but the fact that all three are occurring simultaneously has raised questions about how long President Ali Abdallah Saleh's authoritarian, but increasingly beleaguered, regime can survive. 

This concern is legitimate, but it is hardly new. Saleh became president of North Yemen in 1978 and then of united Yemen when the two Yemens merged. He has also faced serious opposition — internal, external, or both — on many previous occasions over the past three decades. His ability to remain in power has often been doubted, and yet he managed to do so. Further, the opposition he faced in the past was often far more serious than that which he faces now. 

When Saleh first came to power in North Yemen as a result of the assassination of his predecessor, newspaper accounts claimed that the CIA predicted he would last no more than six months.  

The threats he then faced were grave. South Yemen was supporting a Marxist insurgency in the southern part of North Yemen which would not be defeated until 1982. A brief war along the border between North and South took place in 1979 in which the South did relatively better. Later, though, infighting in the South and the collapse of communism induced the South's leaders to unite with the North in 1990.  

Later that year, Saleh made supportive statements and actively sided with Saddam Hussein after the Iraqi president's forces invaded Kuwait, which prompted Saudi Arabia to expel up to 1 million Yemeni workers causing severe economic hardship in Yemen. 

Saleh's severest test came in 1994 when some of the top southern politicians – backed by the Saudis, Kuwaitis, and others in the Gulf – attempted to restore South Yemeni independence. Saleh, though, prevailed. The Saudis reportedly backed some of his tribal opponents afterward, but this ended in a rapprochement between the two countries in 2000. However, some of these tribal opponents teamed up with al-Qaida elements later and fighting broke out, in the Mareb region in 2002-03 in particular. 

The fact that Saleh faces opposition at present, then, is nothing new. Further, while they should not be underrated, there is reason to believe that his current opponents are unlikely to threaten the survival of his regime. 

It has been widely reported that the "Huthi" rebels in the north are Shiites, thus raising the specter that they are linked to Iran. What is less appreciated is that most Shiites in Yemen (including these ones) are Zaidis — a different branch of Shiism than the Iranian ayatollahs adhere to. More importantly, while Zaidis are a minority in Yemen as a whole, much of the Yemeni leadership belongs to this sect.  

From when it became independent from the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I until the republican revolution of 1962, North Yemen's kings were also Zaidi imams. Much of the leadership of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen's official name from 1962 until 1990) also came from the Zaidi elite. They remained predominant after unification in 1990 — especially after much of the South's Sunni leadership was defeated in 1994. 

In addition, Iran does not appear interested in the Huthis. This is understandable. It makes far more sense for Tehran to maintain good relations with Sanaa (which is a potential ally against Riyadh) than to support a movement that probably has little prospect for actually overthrowing and replacing the Saleh regime, and would probably not be subservient to Tehran even if it did. 

The resurgence of unrest in former South Yemen is dramatic. The cause of southern independence, though, appears to have even less chance at success than it did in 1994. Back in 1994, the South's armed forces were still intact. This is not true now.  

In addition, northerners greatly outnumber southerners in Yemen. Nor do northerners wish to see the South become independent again. Absent the ability to drive northern forces out of the South, it is highly doubtful that the pursuit of restoring South Yemen's independence will succeed. 

Various al-Qaida leaders have proclaimed their readiness to take over in Yemen as well as their hope that American forces get bogged down in fighting there.  

Yet while al-Qaida's actions in Yemen are worrisome, its following there appears to be limited. Though some Yemenis may have — most unfortunately — welcomed al-Qaida attacks on American and Western targets, they are not happy about its attacks on fellow Yemenis.  

Nor would the multitude of Yemenis who regularly chew qat (a mildly narcotic leaf that is illegal in many countries, including the United States and Saudi Arabia) welcome the austere rule of al-Qaida, which strongly opposes this practice. 

What is more, the three groups currently opposing the Saleh regime – the Huthis, the southerners, and al-Qaida and its affiliates — do not appear to be cooperating with one another.  

The Shiite Huthis do not want to see the southerners secede or be ruled by radical Sunnis such as al-Qaida. The southerners – especially in Aden — have a more modern, secular orientation stemming first from British and then from Marxist rule.  

Those who do not want to be ruled by the current northern regime do not want to be ruled by ultra-religious Shiites or Sunnis either. And as it has shown elsewhere, al-Qaida has no tolerance either for Shiites or for fellow Sunnis whom it considers to be insufficiently religious (i.e., who do not agree completely with it). 

Finally, although Saleh has not yet defeated each of these three threats, he has proven adept (as he has on similar occasions in the past) at exploiting external concerns about them.  

Washington's concern about al-Qaida and its affiliates has helped Saleh to obtain resources from the United States as well as dampen American calls for democratization in Yemen. Similarly, Saudi concern about Saleh's Shiite opponents in the north (near the Saudi border) has helped Saleh obtain aid from the Saudis.  

At the same time, Saleh has been able to exploit Yemeni resentment over previous Saudi support for southern independence in 1994 to delegitimize southern calls for it now. There have even been reports that Saleh has encouraged Sunni radicals to fight against the Shiite Huthis, thus killing two birds with one stone — literally! 

There is no doubt that Yemen has many severe problems that are only likely to worsen if its economy remains stagnant while its population continues to grow rapidly. The succession from Saleh to another leader, which must occur eventually, could also prove destabilizing.  

But while the Saleh regime has not defeated its three current opponents, it is far from being defeated by any of them. In the past, Saleh has successfully dealt with his opponents through a combination of repression, cooptation, exploitation of rivalries, and foreign support. His ability to continue doing this at present and well into the future should not be underestimated. 

--

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University. 

Source: MIDDLE EAST TIMES  

June 11, 2008